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**The Ebbs and Flows
of Indian Communism**

Secret

RP 77-10236

September 1977

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The Ebbs and Flows of Indian Communism

Office of Regional and Political Analysis

September 1977

Introduction

Recent changes in the fortunes of India's several Communist parties appear to stem from the imposition of a state of emergency by former Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in June 1975. The pro-Soviet Communist Party of India (CPI) sought to align itself with the then-ruling Congress Party and applauded Gandhi for taking "such a forthright and rousing stand against fascism." The Communist Party of India - Marxist (CPM), however, strongly condemned the measures taken by the government in the wake of the emergency decree and put forward its own 10-point plan calling for support from "left and democratic forces" to oppose the government. The Maoist-oriented Communist Party of India - Marxist/Leninist (CPML), whose members are known as Naxalites, already the subject of severe repression by the government, saw many more of its members thrown into prison with indeterminate sentences.

As a result of the national election last March and the state elections in mid-June, the CPI is in virtual disarray and is torn by internal disputes over which direction to follow. Its Soviet patrons also appear confused. In contrast, the postemergency period has been one of great success for the CPM. It is the dominant force in the new West Bengal government and captured an absolute majority in the assembly of that strategically located and economically important state. In addition, CPM relations with the Janata central government have been relatively good, and a Janata-CPM coalition has been installed in the northeastern state of Tripura. Although it is still unclear what course the CPML will steer, the central

government and various state governments have released a sizable number of Naxalites imprisoned before and during the emergency. Their release may make the violence-prone CPML a force to be reckoned with if dissatisfaction with the central government increases.

Background

Communism in India can trace its origins to the 1920s when a loosely knit group of upper caste, highly educated Indians established relations with the Comintern. Although the Communist Party of Great Britain was instrumental in the official founding of the CPI in 1925, its influence quickly waned and was replaced in the 1930s by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Association with Moscow has resulted in direct and indirect financial support as well as attempts by Moscow to use its economic and political influence to temper New Delhi's often stringent domestic anti-Communist policies.

This link with the Soviet Union, although fruitful from Moscow's viewpoint, has not always benefited the CPI. Under Soviet direction, the CPI supported the British war effort during World War II while nationalist Congress leaders opposed Indian participation from their jail cells. Subsequently the CPI was directed to support the creation of Pakistan. Neither action was popular among the Indian masses. Support for the Congress Party and Gandhi during the emergency, again under Soviet direction, helped put the CPI in the straits it finds itself today.

The leadership of the CPI, more so than the other Communist parties, tends to be upper caste and highly

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educated. It has tended to draw its leaders from the intellectual and politically active segments of the population rather than the poor, landless classes. The rank and file is composed of low and middle caste laborers and peasants. Over the years the CPI has grown fairly steadily.

[REDACTED] party members probably numbered about 165,000. This figure, though, has probably shrunk in light of the recent misfortunes of the CPI.

Communism in India has a long history of factionalism centered around both personality and ideological disputes. The CPM was founded in 1964 when the centrist and left factions of the CPI walked out of a CPI National Council meeting. The breach stemmed mainly from domestic differences, many as old as the party itself but previously tolerated to maintain unity. A major cause of left dissatisfaction derived from Soviet efforts in the 1950s to have the CPI moderate its opposition to the government in the interest of improving links between Moscow and New Delhi. The Indian-Chinese border war in late 1962 exacerbated dissension within the CPI when party leaders pledged full support for the Indian Government and denounced the Chinese. Charges were made at the time that pro-Soviet Party Chairman, S. A. Dange, assisted the Nehru government in rounding up over 1,000 left-leaning members of the CPI.

After the split in 1964, the factions within the CPM were united against the CPI and its Soviet "revisionist" policies but were divided over parliamentary versus revolutionary methods. The centrist faction controlled the party machinery from the beginning, however, and participated in the 1967 national and state elections and the midterm state elections in 1969. In both years the CPM was successful in forming a coalition government in West Bengal. These governments were quickly dissolved by the central government, and the state was placed under New Delhi's direct rule because the CPM was unable to control strikes and violence. The leaders who now control the CPM, including Jyoti Basu, Chief Minister of West Bengal, believe that conditions require the party to participate in the constitutional system while gradually developing mass support for its program and carefully preparing for future revolutionary activity. In the Sino-Soviet controversy, except for occasional

financial support from the Soviets, the CPM remains essentially nonaligned. Its membership is difficult to estimate but is probably considerably larger than a 1969 estimate of 65,000 active members. Nationwide the CPM received over 7 million votes in the March 1977 Lok Sabha poll.

The leftists who split off from the CPI in 1964 soon became disenchanted with the centrist leadership of the CPM. As early as 1967, the left extremists set up a Committee to Resist Revisionism within the party and almost immediately began agitation in the Darjeeling district of West Bengal that came to be known as the Naxalbari revolt.* Although the centrist leaders of the CPM had had a hand in propagandizing among the landless peasants in Naxalbari, their assumption of parliamentary power in West Bengal in 1967 forced them to act to suppress the revolt.

By May of 1969, the leftists had completely split from the CPM and formed the CPML. The CPML received early rhetorical and financial support from the Communist Party of China which declared it to be the only true Communist party in India. Naxalite members and leaders are drawn from all segments of the population. West Bengal remains the center of power for the CPML, but relatively cohesive groups of extremists with ties to the CPML exist in a number of other states, including Andhra Pradesh and Kerala.

Historically, the CPML stressed the creation of small "Red Guard" units in the towns and villages of rural India while other extremist elements called for mass organizations. All Naxalites, however, have foresworn parliamentary activity and are dedicated to guerrilla warfare—both rural and urban—to bring about the proletarian revolution. Except for a few mass uprisings, the Naxalites concentrated in the late 1960s and early 1970s on such hit-and-run tactics as the assassination of police, landlords, and other "enemies of the people." In recent years, the CPML has been relatively unsuccessful in the countryside, and its strength now appears centered in the urban areas. Here it draws its strength from middle-class students and the educated unemployed.

Close relations between New Delhi and Moscow, in contrast to the years of antagonism between India and

*The term "Naxalite" has come to mean any leftist who believes in the violent overthrow of the government and, thus, includes members of other organizations besides the CPML.

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China, have influenced the government's attitude toward domestic Communist movements. Sino-Indian relations, for instance, do not serve as a "shield" for the CPML, as Soviet-Indian relations do for the CPI. Under Prime Minister Gandhi the Indian Government took a particularly hard line against the Naxalites and was quick to support preventive detention legislation.

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In addition, Gandhi made a strenuous effort to take over popular CPML issues such as land redistribution. As long as the government can minimize political instability and economic suffering, the Naxalites are unlikely to achieve any notable successes. Furthermore, recent evidence of Chinese desire for improved relations with India will militate against any substantial aid to the Naxalites.

The Emergency

For many years the CPI has followed a policy of selective support for the Congress Party and has thus acquired a degree of respectability. The price the party has paid, though, has been the loss of its role as a dynamic advocate of social and political change. Gandhi, on the other hand, used the CPI's support in her tactical maneuverings to maintain her "progressive and socialistic" image.

Shortly before the declaration of the emergency in June 1975, the CPI reaffirmed its intention to continue supporting the Congress Party in some states while opposing it in others. The emergency decree was met with an almost immediate statement of support from the CPI. The CPI believed that the government would move against only the followers of J. P. Narayan and other elements of the right such as the Jana Sangh and that by supporting Gandhi it could both help push her further to the left and improve Indo-Soviet relations. Gandhi assured the CPI leadership that the party publications would be relatively free from censorship.

The CPI was aware that the power Gandhi acquired could be used against it and decided to maintain a low profile. Precautions were also taken to safeguard party leaders and maintain secret lines of communication. The CPI's fears were quickly realized. Early in the emergency, Sanjay Gandhi, the Prime Minister's son

and head of the Youth Congress, made some critical remarks about the CPI—"I don't think you'll find richer or more corrupt people anywhere." Gandhi also soon realized how little she needed the support of the CPI. Subsequent CPI attacks on Sanjay brought sharp rebukes from Gandhi and a loss of influence in the formulation of Congress Party policies. These attacks from the government, combined with continued support for Gandhi by the Soviet Union and internal dissension within the party, left the CPI in a most untenable and isolated position as the March 1977 elections approached.

The declaration of the emergency, meanwhile, had brought a much harsher reality to the CPM. Although most of the top party leaders were spared, several thousand district leaders were immediately arrested and the party's files either confiscated or destroyed. The CPM moved its party headquarters from Calcutta to Madras, where it received the cooperation and protection of the state's chief minister. Although public agitation against the government was rejected, the CPM established underground organizations in the states of West Bengal, Kerala, Andhra Pradesh, and Tamil Nadu—traditional Communist strongholds.

In August 1975, a CPM document accused Gandhi of using the emergency to create a one-party dictatorship. The CPI was branded as a lackey of both the Soviets and the central government. By mid-1976, however, a decline in membership and intense factionalism within the party led the CPM to seek an understanding with the CPI in an effort to form a united front against the central government's policies. The CPM's overtures were rejected by the CPI, but only after the issue caused severe recriminations by CPM extremists against the more moderate leadership. At this time the CPM also increased its criticism of both the Soviet Union and China. Thus Gandhi's tactic of minimizing Communist influence by promoting Communist divisiveness seemed eminently successful when, in January 1977, she announced that national elections would be held in March.

The emergency decree struck an even harsher blow to the CPML. The government, having no use for the violent tactics of the CPML, stepped up mass arrests of party members and leaders immediately. A large number had been jailed long before the emergency

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was proclaimed. By the end of the emergency, over 12,000 Naxalites had been imprisoned. Some placed the number much higher. The party, already divided and violently opposed to any form of parliamentary rule, did what it could to harass the government. Government forces, however, were extremely successful in defending against these attacks. By the end of the emergency and through the election period, the Naxalites were more of a nuisance than a serious threat to the government.

The Elections

By the time the national election was held, the CPI was in the unhappy position of being virulently attacked by Sanjay Gandhi through his control of the Indian media while at the same time being counseled by the Soviet Union not to break with the Congress Party in the interests of Indo-Soviet relations. In the national election in 1971, the CPI had captured 24 seats in the Lok Sabha—the lower house of Parliament. In 1977 the CPI was able to garner only seven seats—four in Kerala and three in Tamil Nadu.

The CPI, like the Soviet Union, was surprised by the massive Janata Party victory in the March elections. After the elections the Soviets reportedly urged the CPI to move closer to the CPM in order to combat the expected anti-CPI bent of the Janata Party. At the same time, the CPI received indications that the Soviets wanted the CPI to maintain its alliance with the Congress Party, including partnership in a coalition government in Kerala. These conflicting instructions and subsequent squabbling within the party led to further CPI defeats in the 10 north Indian state assembly elections held in mid-June. The CPI won only 49 seats of the more than 2,300 being contested. Prior to this election the CPI had held over 120 seats in these bodies.

CPM was fairly successful in the March national election considering its inability during the emergency to put forward its program. The decisive factor in its capture of 22 seats—17 in West Bengal—was its firm opposition to Gandhi's emergency rule. The CPM held 26 seats in the previous Lok Sabha. The party's particular success in West Bengal can be attributed to its decision to work with the Janata Party during the election campaign. The CPM might have done even better if it had held out for more seats in the electoral

State-By-State Breakdown of Votes Received In March 1977 Lok Sabha Election On a Percentage Basis

STATE	CPI	CPM
Andhra Pradesh.....	2.67	4.72
Assam	1.42	2.88
Bihar	5.63	0.20
Gujarat	---	---
Haryana	0.61	0.03
Himachal Pradesh	1.79	---
Jammu and Kashmir.....	---	---
Karnataka	0.34	---
Kerala.....	10.38	20.32
Madhya Pradesh.....	0.52	---
Maharashtra.....	0.67	3.56
Manipur	11.50	---
Meghalaya.....	---	---
Nagaland	NA	NA
Orissa	3.15	1.98
Punjab	1.65	4.94
Rajasthan	0.48	0.38
Sikkim	---	---
Tamil Nadu	4.60	1.56
Tripura	2.24	34.09
Uttar Pradesh	1.10	0.10
West Bengal	6.49	26.15

agreement, but its true strength was not known until the state assembly elections were held in mid-June.

The state assembly elections were a more decisive victory for the CPM and further vindicated its opposition to emergency rule. Although the CPM could not reach an electoral alliance with the Janata Party, relations with the new government in New Delhi remained cordial. The CPM rejected an alliance with the CPI even though this would have meant support from the Soviet Union. The CPM nationwide won over 200 seats. Of these, 178 were in West Bengal, which gave the CPM absolute control over the state government. The CPM also controls the government in the northeastern state of Tripura in coalition with the Janata Party.

The Naxalites did not contest any seats in the March election in an organized manner—most would have had to do so from prison cells. Some members contested seats on their own in the state elections in June, and two won seats in the West Bengal assembly. This limited participation in parliamentary elections presumably does not reflect any change of heart by

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the majority of Naxalites who still favor the violent overthrow of existing governments.

Outlook

The CPI is still seriously divided over whether its support of the 1975 emergency decree was correct or whether it should have disassociated itself from the Gandhi government. Although the Soviet Union is at least partially responsible for CPI factionalism, knowledgeable sources report that the Soviets are now trying to keep out of CPI infighting. CPI Chairman S. A. Dange is the leading supporter of the view that the CPI's actions between 1975 and 1977 were correct, and Soviet Ambassador Maltsev has convinced General Secretary Rao that the CPI should not abandon Gandhi as a result of the CPI and Congress Party defeats.

The faction that wishes to admit the CPI's past mistakes, however, believes that the party should become more independent of Moscow and follow the lead of the more liberal Communist parties of Western Europe. There are others in the party who believe that the CPI should get on with the business at hand and avoid recriminations.

The Soviet Union officially has friendly relations with the Government of India but has indicated to the CPI that it will try to discredit the Janata government by publicizing the CPI's anti-Janata criticisms. The CPI has increased the pace of its campaign to protest the mistreatment of untouchables and the high rate of unemployment, and to demand the reinstatement of bonus payments for workers that were prohibited during the emergency. The Soviets have also suggested that the CPI protest more vigorously against the US position on nuclear proliferation and the US presence in the Indian Ocean. CPI members of the Lok Sabha have also unsuccessfully sought assurances from the government that US Peace Corps volunteers will not be allowed back in the country.

Unless there is a very sharp economic downturn and/or serious social unrest, the CPI tactics are likely to be unsuccessful. The government has already taken over one CPI issue by indicating that it will reinstate the bonus payments. Under Soviet direction, pro-CPM elements of the CPI have indicated support for a vaguely conceived plan to create a third force in

Indian politics by combining the CPML, the CPM, the CPI, and progressive sections of the Congress and Janata Parties. Such an event can only occur with the full support of the CPM. The stand taken by the CPI during the emergency, the election defeats and subsequent defections from the party, and recent Soviet overtures to the CPM have all combined to make the CPI a minor force in Indian politics and likely to remain one for the foreseeable future.

The CPM's successes on the state level, notably West Bengal, have lent credibility to claims of its leaders to national leadership of the Indian Communist movement. In West Bengal the Chief Minister, Jyoti Basu, in his public statements and actions, has thus far revealed a conciliatory attitude toward the central government and his opponents in West Bengal. Party leaders have reassured industrial and commercial interests in the state that they have nothing to fear from the new government and that Basu personally will see to it that labor unrest is minimized. Basu has also made several trips to New Delhi to promote good relations with the Janata government and extract more aid for his economically troubled state.

Basu reportedly believes that the CPI is trying to disrupt the CPM government by encouraging work slowdowns and industrial sabotage. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union has recently played a major role in trying to reconcile the CPI and the CPM. In May, E. M. S. Namboodiripad, recently appointed general secretary of the CPM, made a short unpublicized trip to the Soviet Union to discuss CPM-Soviet relations and also CPM-CPI relations. The Soviets warned Namboodiripad that good relations were necessary to protect the left from rightist attacks. Soviet aid was promised if the CPM would adopt a more conciliatory position toward the CPI. Soviet-supported elements in the CPI are continuing their efforts to neutralize anti-CPM sentiment. CPI Party Chairman Dange has been ill lately, and his death could hasten a reconciliation.

A late August visit of two East German officials was also arranged by the Soviets as part of the effort to create a CPI-CPM coordination committee. This committee will look into ways to ease disputes between the two parties. Basu is likely to go along with this reconciliation if for no other reason than to indicate his good will towards the Soviets. CPI renunciation of its Congress Party links will probably

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be needed before the CPM takes the reconciliation efforts seriously.

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Basu [redacted] indicated that the Soviets have not yet had an impact on CPM policy. The CPM, however, has gone out of its way to declare its loyalty to the principle of proletarian internationalism and its desire to have good relations with all Communist parties. It is unlikely that the CPM will turn away all Soviet advances, and party leaders can be expected to accept financial aid when it suits their purposes.

The future looks bright for the CPM. Its control of two state governments enables it to have an influence—however slight—on national policy. The success or failure of its programs will be carefully watched in other parts of India. Its success over the longer term may depend on forces largely outside of its control, including economic conditions, relations with the central government, the attitude of the Soviet Union, Naxalite intentions, and industrial unrest. At this point the most serious challenge to the success of the party may be its internal dissensions, especially the continuing conflict in West Bengal between Basu and the State Secretary, Promade das Gupta.

The Naxalites are the great unknown of Indian Communism. The emergency saw the imprisonment of a substantial portion of the CPML's membership and largely deprived the organization of an effective underground movement. Many thousands of Naxalites have been released since the relaxation of the emergency, and the CPML will probably spend the coming year in reorganizing and planning. The Naxalites are likely to eschew any coalition with the CPM or the CPI, and several Naxalite groups have already attacked the "revolutionary" credentials of the

CPM. Prior to the release of the Naxalites some state governments required their signing a written oath abjuring violence. Violence, fed by discontent with the economic policies of the Janata government, will, however, be the keynote of the Naxalite program. Naxalite success can only come at the hands of Janata failure to maintain a minimum level of economic growth.

The Indian Communist movement has not been immune to the many changes brought about in Indian polities by the defeat of the Congress Party. The CPI, by remaining in alliance with the Congress Party, sealed its defeat at the polls. The CPM, on the other hand, by working with the Janata Party for a restoration of parliamentary democracy saw its fortunes rise. This turnaround has forced the various parties to reassess their positions and has prompted the Soviet Union, the major foreign influence on Indian Communism, to rethink its support for the CPI and work for a reconciliation of the two parties. The forces within the CPI that support a reconciliation with the CPM also believe that the CPI should become more independent of Soviet influence. In the wake of its electoral victories, the CPM has maintained its nonaligned status. Thus, direct Soviet influence on Indian Communism may actually diminish should a reconciliation occur. Such a reconciliation would marginally strengthen the Indian Communist movement, but India's Communists—limited in numbers, at odds with the nation's tradition of nonviolence, and with a long history of internal dissension—are likely to remain minor actors on the stage of Indian polities, subject to the ebbs and flows of forces beyond their control.

This working paper has not been coordinated, and the views expressed are those of the author alone. Comments are welcome and should be addressed to Chief, South Asia Division, ORPA, [redacted]

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
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
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